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Merck employees from three different MBA classes can
unequivocally and with righteous indignation argue that
Merck acted ethically. The authors ask how employees learn
to be so "loyal"? Is that deadly loyalty a product of our
educational system, from kindergarten through MBA
programs, and is the mantra that the purpose of business is
to "maximize profits and create shareholder wealth" also a
product of an educational system that has minimized the
insidious evil and immorality of that doctrine?
INTRODUCTION
As law suits mount against Merck for its marketing of its
blockbuster drug, Vioxx, employees of Merck in three different
MBA classes at two different universities taught by the authors
of this article have unabashedly supported Merck's actions as
being ethical. Angry at the suggestion that Merck hid the
dangers of Vioxx and pulled the drug long after they suspected
the drug caused an increased risk of serious cardiovascular
events, including heart attacks, stroke, and death, their loyalty
to Merck remains resolute. Is such loyalty deserved, or is there a
disconnect with the facts, and if so, why?
In September 2004, Merck voluntarily pulled its blockbuster
drug, Vioxx, from the market after an internal study showed that
long-term use of Vioxx-eighteen-months or longer-created
twice the risk of heart attacks and stroke as other drugs used to
combat the pain of osteoarthritis and acute pain in adults.1 Until
Merck removed Vioxx from the marketplace, the drug had
garnered huge profits for a company that had not had a
blockbuster drug for several years. 2 In addition, during the 199901 period, Merck had lost its patent protection on five of its bestselling drugs: Vasotec, Pepcid, Mevacor, Priloxed, and Prinivil. 3

1 Merck Pulls Vioxx Across the Globe, (Sept. 20, 2004) available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6139592 (noting Vioxx was "pulled off market after study
confirmed" it heightened risks of heart attack and stroke).
2 Chris Mondics, Two Vioxx CriticsAllege Pressure, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 19,
2004, at Al, A22 (stating "Vioxx generated sales of $2.5 billion a year, making it a
blockbuster product for a company that in recent years has had difficulty developing new
medications, a problem faced by much of the pharmaceutical industry.").
3 John Simons, Will Merck Survive Vioxx? Looming Lawsuits, Angry Investors,
Declining Profits: The Vioxx Debacle is Just the Late Giant., FORTUNE (Nov. 1, 2004),
available at http://money.cnn.comlmagazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2004/1 1/01/

20071

MERCKAND THE VIOYDEBACLE

And two of its celebrated cholesterol drugs, Zocor and Prayachol,
were to lose their twenty-year patent protection and
marketability by early 2007 when lower-priced generic imitations
came on the market. 4 From 1999-04, Vioxx picked up some of the
slack, generating sales of $2.5 billion a year, making it the best
5
selling drug in the company's history.
Merck and Vioxx have had a stormy relationship since the
Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") May 1999 approval of
Vioxx as reports slowly filtered to the media that long before its
removal of Vioxx from the marketplace, Merck knew that Vioxx
was a dangerous drug and they nevertheless marketed it
6
aggressively to doctors and an unsuspecting public.
Merck is a company that traditionally has had high marks for
its ethical practices and social conscience. In its mission/values
statement, the company stresses that its "business is preserving
and improving human life." 7 Merck's Mission Statement
continues, "[w]e value, above all, the ability to serve everyone
who can benefit from the appropriate use of our products and
services." 8 Throughout its history, Merck has often lived up to its
stated mission. In the 1930's after streptomycin was developed
by a Merck scientist, Merck gave up its patent protection since it
believed the drug was too important a medical breakthrough to
keep to itself.9 Other companies were allowed to produce
streptomycin, and Merck lost potential profits. Since the 1980's,
when Merck found a cure for "river blindness" caused by a
parasitic worm, the company has given away, free of charge, over
forty-million pills a year to African nations to treat and cure this

8189593/index.htm (explaining Merck was soon to lose patent protection on some of its
major drugs, sales of which represented over five billion dollars annually).
4 Alex Berenson, Big Drug Makers See Sales Erode with Their Image, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2005, at Al (highlighting that several drug companies would lose patent
protection by 2007, including Merck).
5 See Mondics, supra note 2 at A22 (noting Vioxx's tremendous sales figures).
6 Robert Cohen, Report: Merck Misled Doctors, STAR-LEDGER, May 6, 2005, at 1
(describing House Committee on Government Reform's findings).
7 Merck CorporatePhilosophy-MissionStatement, http://www.merck.comlaboutl
mission.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (listing Merck's mission and values).
8 Id.
9 Robert B. Zoellick, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic
and Int'l Studies (CSIS), Keynote Address before the Business-HumanitarianForum in
Geneva, Switzerland: Strategic Philanthropy for Business, Jan. 27, 1999 (describing
Merck's history of philanthropy and how it gave streptomycin to Japan to cure
tuberculosis without earning anything in exchange).
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disease.10 And in 2004 Merck offered to give medicines for free to
low-income Medicare beneficiaries." About 4.2 million senior
citizens, with very low incomes, are eligible for a $600 annual
allowance toward drug costs on government-endorsed Medicare
discount cards. Merck said it would provide its medicines free to
those low-income beneficiaries who have exhausted the $600
Medicare subsidy.12
But today, Merck stands awash in lawsuits by those who have
taken Vioxx and suffered heart attacks or strokes. As of April
2006, Merck faced over 9,600 cases nationwide.13 That number
did not include the cases brought by Great Britain residents who
have taken Vioxx and suffered heart attacks or strokes. By
December 2006, the number of law suits filed against Merck in
the United States had risen to over 27,000, with an additional
265 potential class-action suits. 14 Another 14,000 plaintiffs have
entered into stipulations with Merck suspending the time limit
for filing, and a Canadian judge has approved a class-action
lawsuit for residents of Quebec.15 From 1999-04, over eightymillion people worldwide took Vioxx to treat pain. 16 David
Graham, a scientist with the FDA, estimates that in just the
United States, Vioxx may have caused 140,000 heart attacks or
strokes and 55,000 deaths.17
10 Merck Expands Its Commitment to Eliminate River Blindness, availableat
http://www.merck.comlabout/featurestory/05192004_mectizan.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2006) (noting Merck donated Mectizan to many African and Latin American nations in
order to help cure river blindness).
11 Grace-Marie Turner & Joseph R. Antos, Fixing the New Medicare Law # 3: How to
Build on the Drug Discount Card,available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HealthCare/bg1752.cfm (Apr. 26, 2004) (describing Merck's philanthropy regarding lowincome Medicare recipients).
12 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, $600 Credit and Discounts Combine to
Give Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries Significant Discounts on Prescription Drugs,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/medialpress/release.asp?Counter=1056 (last visited Nov. 13,
2006) (listing Merck as one of many medication donors to people with low-incomes).
13 Theresa Agovino, Merck Loses Appeal; Faces Prospect of Nationwide Class-Action
Vioxx Lawsuit, (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://legalsoapbox.freeadvice.com/n15868
_Merck-losesappeal;_faces.prospect of nationwideclassactionVioxxlawsuit.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006) (noting Merck "faces over 9,600 Vioxx-related lawsuits.").
14 Jury Rules in Merck's Favor in Alabama Vioxx Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(December 15, 2006), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,236782,00.html.
15 Janet McConnaughey, Jury Clears Merck in 11th Vioxx Trial; Drug Firm Has Won
3of4 Federal Cases, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2006, at D3.
16 W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would It Have Ended Differently in the
European Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 365-66 (2006) (stating more than 105 million
prescriptions were filled for Vioxx between May 20, 1999 and August 2004).
17 Marc Kaufman, Merck CEO Resigns as Drug Probe Continues, WASH. POST, May 6,
2005, at Al (describing FDA officers' and others' estimations).
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Merck and its employees argue emphatically that Merck has
behaved responsibly and ethically. Company representatives
claim that as soon as there was credible scientific evidence of
Vioxx's negative health risks in those who had taken the drug for
eighteen-months or longer, they pulled the drug.iS They did not
wait for the FDA to decide whether to pull the drug, they did so
themselves. Merck employees are incensed at the suggestion
they acted unethically and to maximize profits, without
consideration of the health of its customers. 19
I. THE LITIGATION-PICKING THE WINNING HAND

Of the more than 27,000 cases in the pipeline, only 12 have
reached a verdict, and most of these are on appeal. Merck has
received a jury verdict in eight cases, and plaintiffs have won
four. Merck has appealed the four losses and vows that it will try
every case already in the legal system. 20 A ninth case in which
Merck won a jury verdict, the trial court judge has overturned,
and the case will be retried. With only 12 decisions out of over
27,000 cases, no clear pattern has emerged from the litigation,
and experts say it may be years before a pattern is set. It has
been estimated that Merck's potential liability could reach $3050 billion. 2 1 That figure does not include Merck's legal costs to

18 Major Victory for Merck in N.J. Vioxx Trial, (Nov. 3, 2005), availableat
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/idi9910674 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (providing Merck
Senior Vice-President's and General Counsel, Kenneth C. Frazier's opinion that Merck
acted responsibly from start to finish with Vioxx).
19 Simons, supra note 3, at 90. Ray Gilmartin, Merck's chairman and CEO responded
that when he got the bad news about Vioxx from research chief, Peter Kim, "my
reaction ... was that we were going to make a decision about Vioxx totally in the interest
of patient safety."
20 See Thomas Ginsberg, Merck Defeat in Vioxx Verdict: The Drugmaker Hid Risks
from the FDA, Jury Ruled, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 12, 2006, at A01. After the
second Merck loss on April 11, 2006, in Atlantic City, New Jersey in the McDarby v.
Merck case, Kenneth Frazier, Merck's General Counsel, vowed to fight each case, and his
co-counsel, Chuck Harell, has echoed, "[w]e're in this for the long haul .. " Id. Thomas
Ginsberg, 3rd Vioxx Trial Ends in Hung Jury, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2005, at
E01 [hereinafter 3rd Vioxx Trial Ends in Hung Jury]. After a hung jury decision in
Houston, Texas in December 2005, Frazier had proffered: "The Vioxx litigation will go on
for years. We have the resources and the resolve to address these cases, one by one, in a
reasonable and responsible manner." Id.
21 Barnaby J. Feder, Federal Panel Consolidates Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2005, at Cl (noting that analysts estimate Merck could face as much as $30 billion dollars
in liabilities stemming from federal and state cases).
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defend the Vioxx litigation. By November 2006, Merck's legal
22
costs were "sizable: $610 million so far."
In August 2005, after more than a month of testimony from
scientific experts, a Texas state jury awarded $24.4 million in
compensatory damages and $229 million in punitive damages to
Carol Ernst, whose husband died in his sleep in 2001 after taking
Vioxx for about eight months. 2 3 Under Texas's limitations on
punitive damage awards, the verdict will be lowered to $26.1
million. Jurors interviewed following the trial stated that the
testimony and documents presented by plaintiffs counsel, Mark
Lanier, had demonstrated to them that Merck had long been
aware of Vioxx's potential heart risks and hid this information
from patients. 24 In a statement issued after the verdict, Merck's
general counsel, Kenneth Frazier, said that the "verdict in Texas
was a disappointment to all of us at Merck because we know we
acted responsibly . . . . We believe we have meritorious defenses,
and we intend to vigorously defend individual Vioxx cases one by
5
one:" 2
On November 3, 2005, in Atlantic County, New Jersey,
with Judge Carol Higbee presiding, Merck won its first jury
verdict, a nine-member jury determining that Vioxx did not cause
Mike Humeston's mild heart attack and that the company did
not .hide risk information. 2 6 Mike Humeston, sixty-years-of-age,
an Idaho postal worker, claimed that Vioxx caused his heart
attack in 2001, after less than two months of intermittent use of
Vioxx. In an eight to one vote, the jurors found that Merck
scientists in 2001 did not believe Vioxx increased the risks of
heart attack and stroke and, therefore, were not obligated to
warn physicians, including the doctor who had prescribed Vioxx

22 Avery Johnson & Heather Won Tesoriero, Merck Adds Another Win In Vioxx
Trials,WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2006, at B1.
23 See Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't Go Away, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't Go Away]
(reporting "Texas jury found Merck liable for the death of Robert C. Ernst, who died in
May 2001 after taking Vioxx .... ").
24 See id. (explaining "[t]o the jurors, the evidence added up to a mass of damaging
bad facts that overwhelmed the company's defense.").
25 Id.
26 See Thomas Ginsberg, Vioxx Victory Key for Merck Jurors Said the Drug Did Not
Cause a Heart Attack. Merck Victory in Trial on Vioxx - 6,400 to go, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Nov. 4, 2005, at A01 [hereinafter Vioxx Victory Key for Merck] (calling case
"key victory").
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to Humeston. 2 7 Voting nine to zero, the jury also rejected
Humeston's consumer fraud claim that Merck had engaged in
"unconscionable commercial practices" in marketing Vioxx, and
finding that Merck did not "intentionally suppress, conceal or
omit material information" about the potential for cardiovascular
problems. 28 Although the jurors were not required to vote on the
issue of "causation," several jurors said they did not believe that
Vioxx caused Humeston's heart attack. One juror noted that he
"only took it for two months, and he was taking a lot of other
stuff," and a second juror stated that "Humeston had way too
many other risk factors to blame it on Vioxx." 2 9
The Merck victory was short-lived. During the trial, Merck's
attorneys used Humeston's medical records to demonstrate to the
jury that he took Vioxx intermittently over the course of two
months, while clinical trials had proved a higher risk of heart
attack existed only after eighteen-months of daily use. 30 Merck's
defense at trial that clinical studies proved Vioxx created an
increased cardiovascular risk only after eighteen months of
taking Vioxx became the centerpiece for plaintiffs post-trial
motions asking the verdict to be set aside and for a new trial. On
August 17, 2006, Judge Higbee granted plaintiffs post-trial
motions. Judge Higbee vacated the jury verdict and ordered a
new trial after Humeston's lawyers presented evidence that
during the trial Merck had withheld evidence which
demonstrated that the company knew Vioxx posed an increased
risk of heart attacks even when taken for less than 18 months. 3 1
On February 17, 2006, Merck won a retrial of a Vioxx suit in a
New Orleans federal district court. 32 The first trial had ended in
a hung jury, after the jury was unable to reach consensus on
27 See id. Humeston's knee pain resulted from a prior shrapnel wound.
28 See id. (noting jury's rejection of Humeston's consumer-fraud claim).
29 Id.

30 See id. Humeston's medical records revealed he ingested fifty-four pills
intermittently for two months, doubling his dose at times when he felt pain.
31 Joshua Pantesco, New Jersey Judge Vacates Merck Vioxx Trial Win, PAPER CHASE
NEWSBURST (Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/
new-jersey-judge-vacates-merck-vioxx.php.
32 See Merck Buoyed by Vioxx Trial Win, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/merck-shares-gain-following-vioxx/story.aspx?
guid=%7B357A3A2F-3767-4D2E-A90C-F9A74EF9DC28%7D%09%09%09%09%09%09&
(last visited Jan. 9, 2007) (explaining this as Merck's third liability case relating to Vioxx
and highlighting that Merck had been found liable in a Texas case and not liable in a
previous New Jersey case).
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Merck's liability to a plaintiff, Richard Irvin, a fifty-three-yearold Florida resident, who died from a heart attack in 2001 after
taking Vioxx for less than a month. 3 3 The second jury reached a
verdict, finding that Vioxx was not the cause of the plaintiffs
heart attack and death. 3 4 Merck's lawyers had argued at trial
that Irvin's age, gender, and diet all put him at risk for a heart
attack. Irvin's widow, a daughter, and a son all testified that
Irvin's health had been excellent up to his heart attack. 3 5 District
Court Judge Eldon Fallon had ruled shortly before trial that two
of the plaintiffs experts-a cardiologist and a pathologist-could
not testify that Vioxx was the cause of Irvin's heart attack
because they were experts in their fields but not about Vioxx. 36
On April 5, 2006, in a consolidated case in Atlantic City, New
Jersey, Merck lost to plaintiff John McDarby and won a defense
verdict against the second plaintiff, Thomas Cona. 37 The
McDarby case was Merck's second loss. In the first phase of a
five-week trial, the jury concluded that the company concealed
the dangers of Vioxx from McDarby, seventy-seven, and Cona,
sixty, and their doctors, and failed to warn them about the drug's
dangers. 3 8 The jury awarded John McDarby $3 million and his
wife $1.5 million in compensatory damages after concluding
Vioxx caused his heart attack in 2004 after four years of use. 39
0
The heart attack has left McDarby extremely weak and frail.4
33 See id. (explaining this was retrial, because previous trial had ended in hung jury).
34 See id. (announcing "federal jury in New Orleans rejected a claim that short-term
use of Vioxx played a role in the 2001 death of a 53-year-old Florida man.").
35 Jury Sides With Merck in Vioxx Trial, USA TODAY, (Feb. 17, 2006), at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/200602-17-merck-vioxxcase-x.htm (stating Irvin's daughter, son and wife all testified that Irvin had been in
excellent health prior to his heart attack).
36 See id. (noting that the most problematic aspect of the case came when Judge
Eldon Fallon would not permit testimony as to whether Vioxx caused Irvin's heart attack
because plaintiffs experts were experts in medicine, but not about Vioxx).
37 Thomas Ginsberg, Ex-Merck CEO Takes the Stand in Penalty Phase of Vioxx Case,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 7, 2006, at CI [hereinafter Ex-Merck-CEO Takes the
Stand] (explaining jury awarded just one of plaintiffs, McDarby of Park Ridge, N.J., $3
million and his wife $1.5 million, while rejecting other plaintiffs claim, Thomas Cona,
sixty, of Cherry Hill).
38 Id. (stating "first phase, the jury of six women and two men concluded the company
concealed the dangers of Vioxx to two plaintiffs and their doctors, and failed to warn them
about the drug's dangers.").
39 Id. (highlighting the jury's verdict in favor of McDarby).
40 See Thomas Ginsberg, Merck Defeat in Vioxx Verdict: The Drugmaker Hid Risks
from the FDA, Jury Ruled, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 12, 2006, at A01 [hereinafter
Merck Defeat in Vioxx Verdict] (quoting McDarby's wife's statements regarding her
husband's condition).
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The McDarby case was tried with a second case, and in the
second case, the jury rendered a defense verdict for Merck, on the
basis that Cona had not taken Vioxx as long as he claimed
(twenty-five months) and did not prove the drug caused his heart
attack.41
In the second phase of jury deliberations, the jury awarded
punitive damages to McDarby in the amount of $9 million. 4 2 To
win punitive damages, McDarby convinced the jury "by clear and
convincing evidence" that Merck "knowingly withheld or
misrepresented" information about Vioxx. 4 3 The jury was also
given instructions by the presiding judge, Superior Court Judge
Carol Higbee, to determine whether Merck had acted with
"willful and wanton" disregard for others.44 After the verdict,
Kenneth Frazier, Merck's general counsel, asserted that Merck
would appeal what he considered to be mistaken verdicts in both
phases of the trial. 4 5 Of the cases nationwide, about 4,200 are in
the New Jersey Superior Court, and all are assigned to Atlantic
County Judge Higbee.46
On April 21, 2006, Merck lost its third case when a state court
jury in South Texas awarded $32 million in damages to the
family of Leonel Garza, a seventy-one-year-old retiree, who died
of a heart attack in 2001 after briefly taking Vioxx.47 Mr. Garza's
family claimed that he had taken Vioxx twenty-five days before
his heart attack. Mr. Garza had a history of heart disease. He
had a heart attack in 1981, had quadruple bypass in 1985, and
was a smoker who was overweight and had high blood pressure.
The family's attorney, Joe Escobedo, argued to the jury that
Vioxx was especially dangerous to Mr. Garza because of these
other risk factors and, thus, it should not have been prescribed to
41 See Ex-Merck-CEO Takes the Stand, supra note 37 (stating jury "rejected the claim
by... Thomas Cona, sixty, of Cherry Hill, that Vioxx caused his 2004 heart attack after
he could not prove he took the drug as long as claimed").
42 See Merck Defeat in Vioxx Verdict, supra note 40 (explaining jury awarded
$9,000,000 in punitive damages, bringing total award to $13,500,000).
43 Id.
44 See id. (noting jurors were asked to decide whether Merck acted with "willful and
wanton" disregard for others).
45 See id. (providing Frazier believed trial "riddled with improper rulings from
Higbee").
46 Id. (highlighting that Merck's headquarters are located in Whitehouse Station,
N.J.).
47 Alex Berenson, Merck Loses Vioxx Suit in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C1
[hereinafter Merck Loses Vioxx Suit in Texas].
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him. 4 8 Lawyers for Merck denounced the verdict and said that
Judge Alex Gabert should have dismissed the case before it
reached a jury because there "really isn't any good science to
indicate that Vioxx can cause a heart attack in less than 30
days."49 The case is particularly significant in that the jury
rejected Merck's argument that Vioxx can only cause
cardiovascular problems after long-term use. 50 Merck attorney
Richard Josephson said they expected the verdict would be
overturned on appeal and that juries in South Texas have a
history of returning large verdicts for local plaintiffs against
companies with headquarters outside the state. 5 1
On July 13, 2006, Merck won its third Vioxx case when a New
Jersey state court jury ruled that Vioxx was not a cause of the
2004 heart attack of a sixty-eight-year-old woman, Elaine
Doherty. 52 The jury also ruled that although Merck had not
warned her about the drug, the company had warned her doctor
of risk factors. The company attributed Ms. Doherty's heart
attack to her age, weight, diabetes, cholesterol, blood pressure,
and clogged arteries. 53 Ms. Doherty, who is five feet, three inches,
once weighed 265 pounds, and is diabetic. Although she had lost
nearly one-hundred-pounds, her blood pressure was normal, and
her diabetes and cholesterol level were improving, the jury
"simply believed that the risk factors were too insurmountable." 5 4
From August 2006 through January 2007, Merck lost one case
and won five others. On August 2, 2006, a Los Angeles state
court jury returned a defense verdict in Grossberg v. Merck. In

48 Id. (quoting Mr. Escobedo: "Mr. Garza was the last person in the world that should
have been taking Vioxx").
49 Id.; see Christopher Bowe, New Vioxx Study ContradictsKey Merck Defense, FIN.
TIMES, May 3, 2006. Despite Merck's assertion, a recent report from McGill University in
Montreal, Canada, has confirmed the dangers of short-term Vioxx use. The study looked
at the government health records about 114,000 elderly Quebec people treated with Vioxx
and found that about 25% of the Vioxx users who suffered heart attacks had the heart
attacks within the first two weeks of taking the drug.
50 See Merck Loses Vioxx Suit in Texas, supra note 47, at C1 (stating Merck's lawyers
believed case should have been dismissed prior to reaching jury, due to lack of evidence
that Vioxx caused Mr. Garza's heart attack).
51 See id. (highlighting Merck's confidence that verdict would be reversed on appeal
and noting plaintiff was well-known resident of county where trial was held).
52 Merck Wins Vioxx Case in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at C4 (providing
jury's findings).
53 See id. (highlighting Ms. Doherty's risk factors).
54 Id.
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that case, the jury rejected plaintiffs claims that his 2001 heart
attack was caused by his intermittent, sporadic use of Vioxx. 55
On August 17, 2006, a New Orleans federal jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, Gerald Barnett, who at age 58 suffered a
serious, but non-fatal heart attack after taking Vioxx for 33
months. 5 6 Merck lawyers had argued to the jury that Barnett,
who had high blood pressure, a family history of heart disease,
and had cardiovascular disease, "was at increased risk for a heart
attack regardless of whether he was taking Vioxx." 57 The jury
rejected Merck's defense and awarded Barnett $50 million
dollars in compensatory damages after he suffered a heart attack
and lost ten years of his life expectancy.S The jury also awarded
Barnett $1 million in punitive damages. 5 9 The jury found that
Merck "knowingly misrepresented or failed to disclose"
information to Barnett's doctors about the risks associated with
taking Vioxx and had "acted in wanton, malicious, willful or
reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights." 6 0 On August 30,
2006, federal district court judge Eldon Fallon ruled that the
compensatory damages were excessive and ordered a retrial on
the amount of damages to be assessed against Merck. 6 1
From September 2006 through January 2007, Merck won four
jury verdicts. On September 28, 2006, a federal jury ruled in
favor of Merck, the jury finding that Vioxx was not linked to
Robert Smith, who at age 52 had a heart attack while shoveling
snow after he had taken Vioxx for knee pain for about four
months. 6 2 As in the other cases, Merck argued that plaintiff had
55 Merck Wins First California Vioxx Case, VIOXX (rofecoxib) Information Center
(Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.merck.com/newsroomlpress-releases/corporate/2006_
0802.html.
56 Helen Steele, Merck Ordered to Pay Damages in Vioxx Case, EARTHTIMES.ORG
(Aug. 18, 2006), http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/8218.html.
57 Breaking News: Merck Loses Latest Vioxx Trial, WALL ST. J. ONLINE ED. (Aug. 17,
2006), http:/fblogs.wsj.comllaw/2006/08/17fbreaking-news-merck-loses-latest-vioxx-trial.
58 See Judge Tosses 'Grossly Excessive' $50 Million Award in Vioxx Case,
FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 30, 2006), [hereinafter$50 Million Award], available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story, 0,2933,211317,00.html.
59 See BreakingNews: Merck Loses Latest Vioxx Trial, supra note 57.
60 See Merck Ordered to Pay Damages in Vioxx Case, supra note 56.
61 Statement of Phil Beck on Today's Ruling Overturning an Excessive VIOXX
DamageAward, VIOXX (rofecoxib) Information Center (Aug. 30, 2006),
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/barnettdamages-overturned-statement-philbeck.pdf.
62 Merck Wins Federal VIOXX Product Liability Case: Smith v. Merck & Co., Inc.,
VIOXX (rofecoxib) Information Center (Sept. 26, 2006),
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/pressreleases/corporate/2006_0926.html.
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pre-existing risk factors for a heart attack, such as high blood
pressure, high cholesterol, a family history of cardiac problems,
63
coronary heart disease, and he was considered medically obese.
Merck argued that these increased risk factors, not Vioxx, caused
64
his heart attack.
On November 16, 2006, a New Orleans federal jury exonerated
Merck for the heart attack of Ron Mason, 64, who was seeking
$690,000 in lost wages and other damages for a 2003 heart
attack after taking Vioxx for 10 1/2 months. 65 In closing
arguments, Merck lawyers argued that Vioxx could not have
caused Mason's heart attack because he took the painkiller for
less than a year and stopped taking it four days before the heart
attack. 6 6 Merck's defense strategy that Vioxx is dangerous only
after a patient ingests the drug continuously for at least 18
months is the same argument that Merck has used to defend
other cases, including the Humeston case. As set out supra, the
trial court judge in the Humeston case overturned the jury
verdict for Merck and ordered a new trial on the basis that Merck
had withheld evidence during the Humeston trial which
demonstrated the company knew Vioxx posed an increased risk
of heart attacks even when taken for less than 18 months.
On December 13, 2006, a New Orleans federal court jury found
in favor of Merck, rejecting Anthony Diedrick's claim that his
heart attack at age forty-seven was caused by taking Vioxx for
six months prior to the heart attack. 67 Merck followed its
patterned defense. Merck lawyers argued that Diedrick was at
increased risk for a heart attack, suffering from high blood
pressure, high cholesterol and diabetes, and Diedrick, therefore,
would have suffered a heart attack whether he took Vioxx or
not. 68 On December 15, 2006, Merck won again when an
Alabama federal court jury found that Vioxx did not cause Gary

63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See McConnaughey, supra note 15.
66 Id.
67 Merck Wins Federal VIOXX Product Liability Case, VIOXX (rofecoxib) Information
Center (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.merck.comlnewsroomlpress-releases/corporate/
2006_1213.html.
68 Id.
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Albright's "small heart attack." 6 9 Merck's lawyers argued that
Albright had hypertension, diabetes, high blood pressure, high
cholesterol, and was overweight. 70 After the case, jurors stated
that Albright had too many health problems to blame his heart
71
attack on Vioxx.
On January 19, 2007, a Los Angeles state trial court judge
declared mistrials after a jury failed to return verdicts in
lawsuits filed by two Vioxx users who claimed that Vioxx was a
major cause of their heart attacks. 72 The cases will be retried.
With 27,000 cases still to be tried, and only 12 having reached
a verdict, with most of those on appeal, it is too early in the
process, which will take years to unfold, to predict the pattern
that may emerge from the Vioxx litigation. Merck's defense
strategy, however, is clear. The plaintiffs are not "perfect"
plaintiffs: Many were at increased risk for cardiovascular events
because of pre-existing hypertension, or being overweight, or
having a family history of cardiac problems. Merck hopes these
factors will persuade jurors that plaintiffs would have suffered a
heart attack or stroke even if they never took Vioxx. Merck's
argument is that plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proof that
Vioxx was the "proximate cause" or a major contributor to
plaintiffs cardiovascular problems. Some juries have agreed
with Merck, and others have not. Some juries have agreed with
Merck that the company did not fail to warn or give information
about the dangers of using Vioxx, while others have found not
only that Merck negligently failed to warn consumers of the
increased risks of taking Vioxx, but that Merck "knowingly
withheld or misrepresented" information about Vioxx and had
acted with "willful and wanton" disregard for the rights and
health of Vioxx users who have suffered a heart attack or stroke,
and that these malicious and reckless actions justify punitive
damage awards of several million or more.

69 See Jury Rules in Merck's Favor in Alabama Vioxx Trial, supra note 14 (stating
that Merck attorney Mike Brock told jurors that Albright had only a "small heart attack"
that did not cause lasting damage to his lifestyle).
70 Id.
71

Id.

72 See VIOXX Plaintiffs Failed to Prove Their Cases, VIOXX (rofecoxib) Information
Center (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.merck.comlnewsroom/press-releases/corporate/
20070118.html.
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Although no clear pattern is discernable after twelve cases,
there likely may develop a correlation between using Vioxx
continuously for more than a few months and the seriousness of
the harm to a plaintiff. In two of the plaintiffs' decisions, in the
Ernst case, the plaintiff used Vioxx continuously for eight
months and died from a heart attack, and in the McDarby case,
plaintiff took Vioxx for four years and suffered a near-fatal heart
attack. In the Merck defense verdicts, in the Humeston case
plaintiff took Vioxx for two months intermittently and suffered a
mild heart attack; in the Irvin case plaintiff died of a heart attack
after taking Vioxx for less than a month; and in the Cona case,
plaintiff said he took Vioxx for twenty-five months before
suffering a heart attack, although jurors after the verdict said
they did not believe that Cona had taken the drug for as long as
he had claimed. The Garza case, in which a Texas jury gave a
plaintiffs verdict for the death of seventy-one-year old, Leonel
Garza, who had taken the drug for less than a month and had
other risk factors, may or may not be an anomaly. Certainly, it
shows, as Merck general counsel Kenneth Frazier noted, that the
"realities of the world are that jury cases have uncertain
outcomes." 7 3 It also shows that Merck is at risk in the Vioxx
cases.
In the McDarby case, the attorney representing plaintiff was
Mark Lanier. This was his second win against Merck, and until
the Garza verdict, he was the only attorney to have won a Vioxx
case. This has raised questions as to whether Lanier is simply a
superior attorney who wins cases that most other attorneys
would lose. Is he such a charismatic and master spin artist that
he subverts the truth and justice? In the cases Lanier has tried,
Merck certainly believes the jury has been blind and misguided.
Or has Merck been myopic and short-sighted in its handling of
the Vioxx debacle? The Merck-Vioxx controversy raises issues as
to whether Merck acted unethically and callously or whether
Merck is, as many of its employees claim, a victim of overzealous
lawyers and their clients as well as of other pharmaceutical
companies jealous of Merck's reputation which wish to damage
that reputation to drive Merck's profits down and theirs up. 7 4
73 See Merck Loses Vioxx Suit in Texas, supra note 47, at C1.
74 In fall 2005 and winter 2006 MBA courses this author taught, there were six Merck
employees who were in the two classes. In the winter 2006 class, one Merck employee
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II. WHAT DID THE COMPANY KNOW AND WHEN DID THEY KNOW

IT?

A. Merck's Defense
Merck has defended the Vioxx cases on two grounds. First,
that they acted responsibly by voluntarily withdrawing Vioxx
from the marketplace in 2004 after the first reliable study
showed that long-term use of Vioxx increased the risk of serious
cardiovascular events. 7 5 Thus, Merck did not hide credible
information of Vioxx's risks from consumers. Second, Merck has
argued that in none of the cases to date has plaintiff met his
burden of proof that Vioxx "caused" his heart attack. 76
Merck's has argued that the company had no reliable scientific
evidence that Vioxx increased the risk of cardiovascular events
until September 2004 when a clinical trial, designed to see if
Vioxx could prevent colon polyps, showed an increased risk of
heart attack and stroke among patients taking Vioxx for
eighteen-months as compared to those who took placebos. 7 7
Merck immediately contacted the FDA on September 27, 2004,
and in a meeting with the FDA on September 28, Merck informed
the agency it would voluntarily withdraw Vioxx. 78 Two days later

argued that he thought the Vioxx controversy partially stemmed from other
pharmaceutical companies jealous of Merck's reputation as an ethical company who had a
blockbuster drug. All six employees believed that Merck had acted ethically and that the
fault for the litigation was greedy plaintiff attorneys and their clients, who were playing
the great American lottery game-the jury system.
75 See Merck Loses Vioxx Suit in Texas, supra note 47, at C1 (noting Merck's
withdrawal of Vioxx after clinical trial revealed an increased risk of heart attack and
stroke when compared with placebos); see also Merck Wins Vioxx Case in New Jersey,
supra note 52, at C4 (stating that Merck withdrew Vioxx after a trial which showed that
it doubled the risk of heart attack when taken for eighteen months).
76 See Merck Loses Vioxx Suit in Texas, supra note 47, at C1 (pointing to decedent's
medical history prior to his use of Vioxx including quadruple heart bypass and a history of
smoking and weight problems); see also Merck Wins Vioxx Case in New Jersey, supra note
48, at C4 (attributing heart attack not to Vioxx, but rather to other risk factors such as:
age, weight, diabetes, cholesterol, blood pressure, and clogged arteries).
77 Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Issues Public Health
Advisory on Vioxx as its Manufacturer Voluntarily Withdraws the Product (Sept. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter
FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx],
available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW0l122.html (explaining nature and results
of Merck's studies).
78 See id. (stating that Merck chose to voluntarily remove Vioxx from market
following learning of these risks).
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Merck announced its withdrawal. 7 9 "Merck did the right thing by
promptly reporting these findings to FDA and voluntarily
withdrawing the product from the market," said the Acting FDA
Commissioner Dr. Lester M. Crawford. 80 He continued,
"[a]lthough the risk that an individual patient would have a
heart attack or stroke related to Vioxx is very small," the study
shows "that patients taking the drug chronically face twice the
risk of a heart attack compared to patients receiving a placebo." 8 1
At the McDarby trial, on April 6, 2006, Raymond Gilmartin,
Merck's ex-CEO,82 testified on cross-examination by Lanier that
he never knowingly masked safety data.8 3 When asked why
Merck had not turned over to the FDA an October 2000 internal
analysis showing the risk of heart attack by Vioxx users ranged
from zero to five-fold over other pain relievers, Gilmartin
testified that Merck had not been obligated to turn the internal
analysis over to the FDA.84 The October 2000 internal analysis
by Merck scientist Deborah Shapiro was titled "preliminary"
summary of data. "What we gave" to the FDA, Gilmartin
testified, "was the raw data, and they do their own analysis." 8 5
Lanier asked, "[a]re you saying it was important enough for
Merck to do this study, but not important enough to send to the
FDA?"86 "No, I'm not telling you that at all," Gilmartin replied,
stating that Merck's analysis was only preliminary and thus
potentially flawed.8 7 He added, "[w]e submit what we believe is
the appropriate analysis, and I'm confident we submitted the
79 Id. The FDA announced the voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx from the market on
September 30, 2004, two days after its meeting with Merck wherein Merck disclosed its
finding concerning colon polyps.
80 Id. (commending Vioxx for voluntary withdrawal despite FDA's increased scrutiny
of that drug).
81 Id.
82 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at Al. Gilmartin resigned as CEO on May 5, 2005,
the same day that congressional investigators released a slew of documents detailing how
the company continued to aggressively promote Vioxx after it knew of potentially serious
safety concerns.
83 See Ex-Merck-CEO Takes the Stand, supra note 37, at Cl. Responding to an email
presented by the Plaintiff in which Merck chief scientist complained of a lack of freedom
under the new CEO, Gilmartin reaffirmed his statement that he never knowingly
withheld data and stated that the scientist "did have freedom." Id.
84 See id. (admitting Merck failed to turn over potentially "damning internal
analysis").
85 Ex-Merck-CEO Takes the Stand, supra note 37, at Cl.
86 Id.
87 See id. (denying Lanier's accusations).
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data."8 8 On redirect examination, Gilmartin testified that Merck
had submitted to the FDA a different analysis, dated 2001,
89
containing all the same data, but laid out in a different form.
In addition, Merck has argued that it acted responsibly in
submitting to the FDA in June 2000, the results of a study called
VIGOR,90 which showed a four-time increase in the risk of
serious cardiovascular events compared to naproxen. 9 1 Merck
also released this information to the media, although they did not
directly contact physicians prescribing Vioxx.92 Merck has
claimed that any wide-awake physician would have known of the
published research on the VIGOR studies. In April 2002, the
FDA asked for changes in the labeling of Vioxx to warn
physicians and patients of the risks, and Merck complied with
the FDA request. 93
Those defending Merck have argued that no drug is without
risk. They reason that drugs cannot be made perfectly safe, and
even aspirin can have side effects. Thus, a person who takes
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Report of John S. Martin, Jr. to the Special Comm. of the Bd. of Dir. of Merck &
Co., Inc. Concerning the Conduct of Senior Mgmt in the Dev. and Mktg. of Vioxx (Sept. 5,
2006), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxxlpdfl 005exhibit_4_
glossaryof terms.pdf (defining VIGOR as Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research and
explaining it as "[d]ouble-blind study by MRL assessing the comparative efficacy and
gastrointestinal safety of Vioxx 50 mg and naproxen 1000 mg; found a statistically
significant decrease in PUBs among patients on Vioxx and a statistically significant
difference in cardiovascular adverse events favoring naproxen.").
91 See FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx, supra note 77 (discussing Merck's
June 2000 submission of the VIGOR safety study to the FDA and quoting Acting FDA
Commissioner Dr. Lester M. Crawford: 'qMerck did the right thing by promptly reporting
these findings to FDA and voluntarily withdrawing the product from the market").
92 See, e.g., Claire Bombardier M.D. et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal
Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1520, 1522-1525 (2000) (assessing rofecoxib's efficacy in first scholarly article
dealing with effects of drugs like Vioxx based on information provided by Merck
employees); Eric J. Topol, M.D., Failing the Public Health - Rofecoxib, Merck, and the
FDA, NEW ENG. J. MED. 351;17, 1707, 1707 (2004) (criticizing Merck's failure to release
data on drug until November 23, 2000, when New England Journal of Medicine reported
data in Bombadier article that later became subject of attack on Merck because data was
found to be based on incomplete information).
93 See Report of John S. Martin, Jr. to the Special Comm. of the Bd. of Dir. of Merck &
Co., Inc. Concerning the Conduct of Senior Mgmt in the Dev. and Mktg. of Vioxx (Sept. 5,
2006), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/032-appendix -n fda_
analysis-ofvioxxcardiovasculardata-and labelissues.pdf. The FDA and Merck
negotiated over revisions to the Vioxx label that were approved on April 12, 2002. Merck's
final version incorporated the FDA's proposals, "which included specifying that the
serious cardiovascular events in the VIGOR Trial included sudden death .... Merck also
accepted the FDA's request to relocate cautionary language concerning the use of Vioxx by
patients with a medical history of ischemic heart disease from the end of the
cardiovascular precaution to the beginning." Id.
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drugs must understand that there are side effects and take
responsibility for his/her decision to take any medication. 9 4 In
addition, the risk of a heart attack or stroke from using Vioxx is
still a small risk. 95
B. The Case Against Merck
i. The Vioxx Clinical Trials
Prior to the FDA's approval of Vioxx in May 1999, there was
evidence that Merck had concerns that the drug may cause
serious cardiovascular events. 9 6 Internal Merck documents
showed that company executives and scientists were worried
about Vioxx's potential cardiovascular risks as early as
November 1996-more than two years before selling the drugbut rejected plans to conduct a study evaluating these risks. 97 A
November 1996 internal memorandum by a Merck official
indicated the company was struggling with a marketing
dilemma, as Vioxx had limited market potential unless it could
gain acceptance in the mass market for pain killers and be
preferred to cheap over-the counter-drugs such as aspirin or
ibuprofen, which cost about five cents a pill versus several dollars
for Vioxx. 98 The author of the memorandum noted that Merck
was reluctant to conduct a trial to prove Vioxx was gentler on the
94 These comments were made by students in the author's MBA class on Business
Ethics discussing Vioxx during the fall 2005 semester at La Salle University. Although
these comments may not have been made by Merck scientists and executives, they
nevertheless represent the "maximization of profits" mindset.
95 See FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx, supra note 77. Acting FDA
Commissioner Dr. Lester M. Crawford stated that "[a]lthough the risk that an individual
patient would have a heart attack or stroke related to Vioxx is very small... " patients
taking Vioxx nonetheless were at twice the risk of suffering heart attacks when compared
to patients given placebos. Id.
96 See Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Jury Calls Merck Liable] (stating that documents and
emails from Merck scientists discussed these potential heart risks in 1997).
97 See Berenson, supra note 4, at A17 (citing internal Merck documents).
98 See generally Marc Kaufman, New Study Criticizes Painkiller Marketing, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 2005, Al [hereinafter New Study Criticizes PainkillerMarketing]. A study
published in "Archives of Internal Medicine" asserted that the majority of patients who
were persuaded by direct-to-consumer advertising campaigns of prescription arthritis
drugs such as Vioxx would have experienced similar results on older, cheaper
medications. The study stated that the aggressive direct-to-consumer advertising
campaigns launched in 1998 and 1999 lead to the drug's overuse by patients and doctors.
Advertising reports indicated that Merck spent $79.2 million on Vioxx ads in 2003,
making Vioxx one of the most heavily advertised drugs of all time.
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stomach than older painkillers because in order to clearly show
this difference, the patients using Vioxx could not also take
aspirin, which reduces the risk of heart attacks. This created a
dilemma because if patients could take only Vioxx but not any
aspirin there was "a substantial chance that significantly higher
rates" of cardiovascular problems would occur in this group. 9 9 In
a 1997 e-mail message, Dr. Alise Reicin, a Merck scientist wrote:
"The possibility of increased C.V. events is of great concern."1 00
C.V. "is a scientific shorthand for cardiovascular problems" such
as heart attack or stroke.Z0i "I just can't wait to be the one to
1 02
present those results to senior management," she continued.
A 1998 Merck clinical trial called "Study 090" involving 978
patients showed that serious cardiovascular events, including
heart attack and stroke, occurred almost six times more often in
patients taking Vioxx than in patients taking another arthritis
drug or a placebo.1 0 3 Merck did not publish the clinical trial. 104
In 1998 medical researchers at the University of Pennsylvania
reported findings that Cox-2 inhibitors, such as Vioxx, might
interfere with enzymes thought to play key roles in warding off
cardiovascular disease. The findings were communicated to the
companies such as Merck developing Cox-2 inhibitors and were
also published. 105
In May 1999, the FDA approved the use of Vioxx for the
reduction of pain and inflammation caused by osteoarthritis, for
acute pain in adults, and for the treatment of menstrual pain.106
99 See Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning Signs: Emails Suggest
Merck Knew Vioxx's Dangers at Early Stage - As Heart-Risk Evidence Rose, Officials
Played Hardball; Internal Message: 'Dodge!'- Company Says 'Out of Context, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 1 2004, at Al. Merck officials acknowledged that unless these patients also took
aspirin more blood clots would occur.
100 For Merck, Paper Trail Won't Go Away, supra note 23, at 1.
101 See id. (explaining this term).
102 Id.

103 See 60 Minutes: Prescriptionfor Trouble (CBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 2004),
available at http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2004/11/14/60minutes/main655577.shtml
(describing results from Dr. Eric Topol's, chief of cardiovascular medicine at Cleveland
Clinic, statistical analysis on Vioxx).
104 See id. (explaining Merck considered study too small and statistically insignificant
to warrant conclusive evidence).
105 Simons, supra note 3 (quoting study's author as saying "[wie immediately
postulated to the companies developing COX-2 inhibitors, and subsequently reported in
print, that this was something that could lead to heart attacks and strokes").
106 See Sandra Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director of the Office of New Drugs at the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"), and FDA, Statement Before U.S.
Senate, Committee on Finance, (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/olal
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At the time of approval, the FDA reviewer, Dr. Villalba, wrote a
memorandum expressing his concern that the data available
seemed to suggest that cardiovascular events are more frequent
in patients taking Vioxx rather than a placebo.10 7
Although Merck scientists and executives, as well as other
scientists, had concerns about the cardiovascular effect of Vioxx
prior to its FDA approval, the company failed to conduct
cardiovascular trials that would directly examine whether there
were increased cardiovascular events associated with taking
Vioxx. The failure of Merck to conduct cardiovascular trials to
measure cardiovascular events continued from 1999 until 2004,
when Merck pulled the drug from the market. Merck never
performed a study dedicated to measure cardiovascular effects.
Several scientists have claimed that Merck conducted studies
that would place Vioxx in the best light possible to market the
drug, and not to find out the extent, if any, to which Vioxx caused
cardiovascular problems. 108
In June 2000 Merck submitted to the FDA the final data from
VIGOR, which showed a decrease in gastrointestinal problems,
but a four-fold higher risk of heart attack compared with
naproxen. 10 9 Merck had conducted the study to see if Vioxx had a
lower risk of gastrointestinal ulcers and bleeding than other
drugs such as ibuprofen and naproxen. Merck reported the
results of the study in the New England Journal of Medicine, but
did not notify physicians of the findings.
Subsequent to reviewing the VIGOR study and results from
other controlled clinical trials, the FDA conferred with its
Arthritis Advisory Committee in February of 2001 in reference to
this new safety information.11 Fourteen months later, in April
2002, the FDA implemented labeling changes to reflect these
2004/vioxxl 118.html (noting "FDA approved Vioxx in May 1999 for the reduction of signs
and symptoms of osteoarthritis, as well as for acute pain in adults and for the treatment
of primary dysmenorrhea.").
107 Eric J. Topol, M.D., Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, NEW ENG. J. MED. 351;27,
2875, 2877 (2004) (describing Dr. Villalba's statements at time of Vioxx's approval in May
1999).
108 See id. at 2877-78 (discussing previous studies and comments made by some
scientists involved).
109 See FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx, supra note 77 (noting both
benefit of decreased gastronomical side effects and increased risk of cardiovascular events
compared to other drugs).
110 Id.
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new findings.ill The labeling changes required that Merck warn
consumers about the heightened risk of cardiovascular sideeffects, namely, "heart attack and stroke."11 2 Nevertheless, from
the time that Merck submitted the information to the FDA
twenty-months elapsed before physicians were notified of the
dangers of using Vioxx, as shown by the VIGOR study.
Despite the cardiovascular risks, Merck engaged in
misdirection and down-played the results of the VIGOR study.
As the FDA and other scientists have noted, the VIGOR study
showed cardiovascular events increased five-fold from use of the
drug, not four-fold as Merck claimed."l 3 Additionally, Merck
could have chosen to notify prescribing physicians of their
findings in March 2000, when they received the results of the
VIGOR study; yet, they chose not to do so. Merck's argument
that a wide-awake physician would have read the New England
Journal of Medicine belies the reality of a medical practitioner's
life. Doctors do not read every piece of professional literature
any more than attorneys do. Doctors rely on the salesperson to
give them accurate information about the drug.114 Moreover, the
legal standard is not whether the FDA was notified or there was
a journal article discussing the VIGOR study, but whether Merck
adequately notified treating physicians of Vioxx's risks of
cardiovascular events that Merck either knew or should have
known about."iD Until forced by the FDA in April 2002 to change
its labeling to reflect the increased risks of cardiovascular events,
Merck chose to ignore the health implications shown by the
111

Id.

112 See id. (describing types of risks Vioxx labels had to explain).
113 See Healthwatckh Thmeline Of V.or-Related Events (CBS television broadcast Apr. 5, 2006),
available at http'/www.cbsnews.comstoies/2006R04/05/healthmain1476188.shtml. "June 2000: Merck
gives FDA results of VIGOR study, which shows Vioxx users suffered five times as many heart attacks
as users of the older painkiller naproxen .... Id.
114 See Kevin Freking, Selling Vioxx: Merck Used Code-Named Projects to Boost Their
Sales Despite Safety Concerns, SEATTLE TIMES, May 5, 2005, at Nation & World (testifying
before House Government Reform Committee about how drugs are marketed to doctors,
Dr. Michael Wilkes, vice dean for medical education at University of California-Davis,
admitted doctors are busy and look for shortcuts to get information).
115 See Vioxx Victory Key for Merck, supra note 26, at A01. In the Humeston case, the
trial court judge gave the jury the following instruction: "Did Merck fail to provide an
adequate warning to prescribing physicians of an association between Vioxx and an
increased risk of serious cardiovascular events that the defendant ether knew or should
have known about prior to Mr. Humeston's heart attack?" Id. In an 8-1 vote, the
Humeston jury sided with Merck, finding there was no failure to warn since Merck did
not believe in 2001 at the time of Humeston's mild heart attack that Vioxx increased the
risk of cardiovascular events.
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VIGOR study. Despite ex-CEO Gilmartin's testimony at trial
that Merck "wanted" to place a warning label on the Vioxx
medicine,11 6 internal Merck documents show otherwise.iX7
Lanier introduced in the Ernst trial internal Merck documents
which reveal that Merck resisted the FDA's efforts to add
warnings to Vioxx's label and eventually complied in ways that
the Ernst jury found obscure. "You had to dig three levels to see
it," one juror stated.118
In addition, Merck downplayed the VIGOR results,
hypothesizing that naproxen, like aspirin, benefited the heart
and that Vioxx did no harm.119 Merck did not conduct trials to
test this hypothesis,120 but that did not stop Merck from
marketing the drug and downplaying the VIGOR study.
In March 2000, when Merck became aware of the VIGOR
study's findings of a significant increase in cardiovascular events
for those taking Vioxx over naproxen, Merck scientists expressed
concern. In an e-mail message written in March 2000, Dr.
Edward Scolnick, who was then Merck's head of research, stated
that the VIGOR clinical trial had shown that Vioxx increased
heart risks.121 "The CV events were clearly there," he wrote.122
Despite clear warnings, Merck decided against conducting
studies on the heart risks because marketing executives worried
it might hurt Vioxx's sales.12 3 Internal Merck analyses in 2001
116 See Ex-Merck-CEO Takes the Stand, supra note 37, at C1 (responding to
assertions that Merck was influenced by potential lost sales that if new warning label
were placed on Vioxx).
117 See For Merck, the Vioxx Trail Won't Go Away, supra note 23, at 1. In the Ernst
trial jurors were presented by the plaintiff with a series of e-mails and internal Merck
documents which indicated that Merck had resisted the F.D.A.'s efforts to add warnings
of potential heart risks to the Vioxx label).
118 Id. (describing one version of the drug's labeling).
119 See Rita Rubin, Merck Repeats: We Didn't Know of Vioxx Threat, USA TODAY, Oct.
14, 2004 (providing "company credited naproxen for preventing blood clots from forming
and causing heart attacks or stroke.").
120 Id. "Animal studies suggested that was the case, said Alise Reicin, vice president
of clinical research at Merck Research Laboratories. However, Merck wrote in a March
2000 press release, there had been no human trials to confirm that naproxen did indeed
protect against heart attacks and strokes." Id.
121 See Alex Berenson, In Training Video, Merck Said Vioxx Did Not Increase Risk of
Heart Attack, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at C4 [hereinafter In Training Video, Merck Said
Vioxx Did Not Increase Risk of Heart Attack] (indicating evidence was introduced to jury
in Robert Ernst's case).
122 Id.
123 See For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't Go Away, supra note 23 (describing
ways in which sales representatives were trained to dodge questions about Vioxx's heart
risks).
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and 2002 also showed that Merck was worried about lost profits
if warnings or precautions were put on its label.12 4 During that
period, Merck was in private negotiations with the FDA over
changes to its Vioxx label. David Anstice, who, at that time, was
the president of Merck's Human Health division, projected that a
strict warning would reduce sales by at least 50%.125
After the VIGOR study findings in March 2000, a second
internal Merck analysis performed in October 2000 also showed a
significant increase in cardiovascular events for those taking
Vioxx. 126 The Merck analysis, plaintiffs attorney Mark Lanier
has argued, was never presented to the FDA nor to the media,
and certainly was not given to the physicians prescribing
Vioxx.1 2 7 The analysis was simply buried inside Merck.
Gilmartin's response during examination by Lanier at McDarby's
trial was that the analysis was "preliminary" and "potentially
flawed"; the FDA received the raw data and could do their own
analysis; and Merck was not obligated by FDA rules to do
more. 128 The internal analysis, called a meta-analysis, revealed
that patients taking Vioxx were twice as likely to suffer heart
attacks as those taking other painkillers.129 Merck's analysis
included the review of 20,000 study patients from five trials.
Although some findings from the study were given to the FDA in
January 2001 in preparation for a regulatory meeting, Merck did
not include the portion that measured the rates at which Vioxx
users suffered heart attacks.130
124 See id. (stating that "$229 million punitive damages figure was not picked at
random, but reffered to a 2001 Merck estimate of additional profit the company might
make if it could delay an F.D.A. warning on Vioxx's heart risk.").
125 See Thomas Ginsberg, Merck's Former Chief Executive Denies Concealing Safety
Data, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 6, 2006. Gilmartin's response was that the lost profit
analysis "didn't have any influence over the discussion" with the FDA, that "it had
nothing to do with our negotiations" and that Merck "wanted that label." Id.
126 See Peter Loftus, Jury Says Merck Misled FDA, Awards Another $9M to Heart
Attack Victim, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 12, 2006, at 12 (discussing case of seventy-seven-year-old
man who had heart attack after taking Vioxx and highlighting this memo's use as
evidence at trial).
127 See id. (noting Lanier's statements regarding Merck's failure to release this
information).
128 See id. (stating that "Merck argued that the analysis was preliminary and not
required by the FDA, and said it did submit the underlying clinical data.").
129 See Ed Silverman, Links to Heart Attacks Withheld; Merck Says it Didn't Need to
Report its Findings on Vioxx to the FDA, POST-STANDARD, July 5, 2005, at B6
(highlighting that Merck conducted "internal analysis... that revealed patients taking
the drug were twice as likely to suffer heart attacks as those on similar painkillers.").
130 See id. (describing Merck's omission of this portion of data).
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Despite clear danger signals in 2000 from VIGOR and metaanalysis studies and a request in 2001 from a group of scientists
that Merck conduct dedicated cardiovascular trials, Merck did
not do so, 13 1 preferring instead to conduct trials that would show
the potential benefits of Vioxx. Such trials included the VIGOR
trial (dedicated to showing whether Vioxx decreased the risk of
gastrointestinal problems sometimes associated with other pain
relievers) and the APPROVe132 and VICTOR133 trials (dedicated
to measuring whether Vioxx prevented the formation of colon
polyps and was helpful in treating patients with a history of
colon cancer).
Aided by Merck's masking negative trial results and failure to
conduct dedicated cardiovascular trials, the FDA approval
process failed. The pre-approval trials to determine the safety of
the drug lasted less than twelve months, even though many
people taking Vioxx for arthritis would likely take the drug for
much longer periods of time. 134 Swiss Scientist Matthew Eggar
and a co-scientist analyzed the results from eighteen randomized
clinical trials and eleven observational studies-many completed
before 2001-and determined that Vioxx could have, and should
have, been pulled from the market long before September
2004.135 Egger stated that "[i]f we can do this kind of analysis,

131 See Topol, supra note 107, at 1707 (asserting Dr. Eric Topol, M.D. and his
colleagues asked Merck to perform dedicated cardiovascular trials specifically designed to
compare the incidence of serious cardiovascular events in patients taking Vioxx as
compared with those taking other pain relievers or placebo).
132 See Vioxx Timeline Key Dates for VIGOR and Long-Term, Placebo-Controlled
Studies Implemented to Provide CardiovascularSafety Data, http://www.merck.coml
newsroom/vioxxpdf/vioxx timeline.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (stating "APPROVe
was a multi-center, randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind study to determine the
effect of 156 weeks (3 years) of treatment with rofecoxib on the recurrence of adenomatous
polyps of the large bowel in patients with a history of colorectal adenomas.").
133 See id. (explaining "VICTOR was a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled,
international, multicenter study of VIOXX in 7,000 colorectal cancer patients following
potentially curative therapy.").
134 See Martin & Jones, Vioxx Lawsuit, http://www.vioxx-recall-lawsuit.coml (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006) (stating "problems with Vioxx began before the drug was approved
for sale in the United States.").
135 See Anna Gosline, Vioxx Heart Risks Apparent for Years, NEWSCIENTIST.COM
(Nov. 5, 2004), http://www.newscientist.comlarticle/dn6627-vioxx-heart-risks-apparentfor-years.html (noting "[s]cientific evidence of increased heart attack risk associated with
popular arthritis drug Vioxx was available as early as 2000 ... although the drug was
only withdrawn in September 2004.").
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it's difficult to see why it wasn't done by the drug company or the
licensing authorities years ago. '"136
ii. Marketing of Vioxx
Instead of heeding the warning signals and the available data,
Merck and its employees aggressively marketed Vioxx to doctors
and an unsuspecting public. One memorandum, dated February
9, 2001, prohibited sales representatives from initiating
"discussions on a study that raised heart concerns." 13 7 "Another
document describe[d] 'obstacle handling' to overcome physician
concerns" about Vioxx's safety.13 8 Internal Merck documents
made public by the House Committee on Government Reform
investigating how drugs are marketed to doctors revealed that
Merck instructed its salespersons to avoid discussions with
doctors regarding the cardiovascular risks found by the VIGOR
study. 13 9 "Sales representatives were told instead to rely on a
'Cardiovascular Card' that said Vioxx was protecting the heart
rather than potentially harming it."140 To market Vioxx, Merck
prepared an in-house training game for Vioxx sales
representatives dubbed "Dodge Ball." Sales trainees could only
move on to the next round of the card game if they gave Merckapproved answers to doctors' questions raising Vioxx safety
concerns, or dodged such questions altogether.141 The hearings
found evidence of a disconnect between the science and the sales
pitch used by the company's field staff. Merck, for example,
instructed its sales representatives to provide only certain
approved study results to doctors.1 42 "By contrast, those studies
136 Id. Egger suggests that many participants in Vioxx trials were at a much lower
risk of cardiovascular events than the elderly population who generally uses arthritis
medications. Given a representative profile of the population using Vioxx, he believed the
drug could increase the risk of heart attacks or stroke by up to eight times. Id.
137 See Freking, supra note 114, at Nation & World. The document was present
during a congressional inquiry by the House Government Reform Committee in May
2005.
138 Id.

139 Kaufman, supra note 17, at Al (announcing Gilmartin's resignation on same day
incriminating documents were made public).
140 Id.
141 See Vioxx Exec Explains Ethics, "Dodge Ball" CNN.coM. (July 19, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2O05/LAW/07/19/vioxx.trial.ap/index.html.
Nancy Santanello
of
Merck's department of epidemiology nonetheless asserted that participants who dodged
all of the questions could not win the game.
142 See Freking, supra note 114, at Nation &World (stating "when doctors asked
about heart risks, the sales reps were to provide a 'cardiovascular card' with data
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that raised safety questions about drugs were considered
background studies. Distributing the results of a background
study was 'a clear violation of company policy'."14 3
On September 17, 2001, the FDA issued a "Warning Letter" to
Merck for its concerns as to its marketing of Vioxx.1 44 After
reviewing Merck's marketing activities and promotional
materials, it concluded that "they are false, lacking in fair
balance, or otherwise misleading in violation of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act."' 45 The Letter chastised Merck for
engaging "in a promotional campaign for Vioxx that minimized
the potentially serious cardiovascular findings that were
observed" in the VIGOR study.146 Regarding Merck's explanation
for the VIGOR results that naproxen benefits the heart but that
Vioxx does no harm, the FDA stated that Merck had failed "to
disclose" that its "explanation is hypothetical, has not been
demonstrated by substantial evidence, and that there is another
reasonable explanation," that Vioxx may simply increase the
risks of cardiovascular events.1 4 7 "As you know," the FDA
explained to Gilmartin, "the reason for the difference between
Vioxx and naproxen has not been determined."1 48 The FDA
identified the following Merck press release from May 22, 2001,
"Merck Confirms Favorable Cardiovascular Safety Profile of
Vioxx," which the FDA concluded was also "false or
misleading."14 9 "Your claim in the press release," the FDA wrote,
"that Vioxx has a 'favorable cardiovascular safety profile,' is
simply incomprehensible, given the rate of MI and serious
cardiovascular events compared to naproxen."150 In addition, the
Letter continued, "Merck sales representatives have engaged in
suggesting that Vioxx could be eight to 11 times safer than other anti-inflammatory
drugs.").
143 See Henry Waxman, The Lessons of Vioxx-Drug Safety and Sales, 352 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2576, 2577 (2004). Waxman, a Democrat, is a House representative from
California and participated in the congressional hearings on May 5, 2005, before the
Government Reform Committee of the U.S. House.
144 See generally, FDA Warning Letter to Raymond V. Gilmartin, President and CEO
Merck & Co., Inc., (Sept. 17, 2001), available at www.fda.gov/foi/warningletters/
g1751d.pdf. FDA experts had publicly expressed serious concerns to the agency's advisory
committee about its promotional and marketing activities deeming Vioxx safe.
145 Id. at 1.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1-2.
148 Id. at 3-4.
149 Id. at 6.
150 Id.
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false or misleading promotional activities that also minimize the
potentially serious MI results observed in the VIGOR trial."'51
The FDA 2001 Warning Letter noted that on December 16, 1999,
the FDA had objected to Merck's "dissemination of promotional
materials for Vioxx that misrepresented Vioxx's safety profile,
contained unsubstantiated comparative claims, and lacked fair
balance," but that Merck had taken no action to remedy these
52

violations.1

iii. Silencing Critics

In addition to aggressive and misleading marketing strategies,
Merck, along with the FDA, has been accused of harassing
Vioxx's critics.153 In an investigation by the Senate Finance

Committee, two leading scientists testified that they were
"pressured to back off criticism of Vioxx" after expressing concern
that the drug might increase the risks of heart attacks and
strokes.154 David Graham, a scientist at FDA, said that "when he
raised questions about the safety of Vioxx with other FDA
officials, he was pressured to keep quiet."' 5 5 He also said the
FDA tried to prevent him from publishing his findings on
Vioxx. 1 56 Gurkirpal Singh, a professor at Stanford University's
medical school, said that a Merck senior executive had contacted
his superiors to warn that if Singh continued to express his
concerns about Vioxx he would have career problems in the
future. Singh explained, "I was warned that if I persisted in this
fashion, there would be serious consequences for me." 157 Singh
testified that "questions about Vioxx's safety were known to
Merck years before its introduction, and he accused the company

151 Id. at 7.
152 See id. (stating that Merck continued its behavior despite written notification of
similar violations).
153 See Mondics, supra note 2, at Al.
154 See id. As a result of this internal pressure, an F.D.A. scientist expressed his
opinion that as currently configured the FDA is "incapable of protecting America against
another Vioxx." Id.
155 Id.
156 FDA and Merck Vioxx Probe by House Energy and Commerce Committee, MED.
NEWS TODAY (Nov. 24, 2004), availableat hftp://www.medicalnewstoday.com/
printerfriendlynews.php?newsid=16822 (commenting that Graham's bosses at FDA tried
to prevent him from publishing his Vioxx findings).
157 See Mondics, supra note 2, at Al.
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of designing studies that would emphasize the benefits while
minimizing the risks."158
C. Merck's EscalatingLegal Problems over Vioxx
The 9,650 individual Vioxx law suits filed as of April 2006 may
be just the start of the roller coaster ride for Merck.1 5 9 In 2005,
the Texas Attorney General filed suit against the company,
demanding $168 million in damages for willfully misrepresenting
Vioxx's safety to the state, which filled an estimated 700,000
subscriptions through Medicaid.16 0 If the punitive damage award
handed down in New Jersey on April 11, 2006 in the McDarby
case is upheld, experts said that this could trigger a state
criminal investigation.161 In the federal sector, the Justice
Department has already launched a criminal investigation
related to Merck's research, marketing, and selling of Vioxx, and
the Securities and Exchange Committee is conducting an
informal inquiry.16 2 The House Energy and Commerce
Committee held public hearings in November, 2004, on Merck
and the FDA's handling of the drug's safety issues. 16 3 On May 5,
2005, the House Government Reform Committee conducted
public hearings on FDA reform, focusing on Merck and Vioxx.16 4
In addition to governmental investigations, a class action lawsuit
has been filed in federal court in New Jersey on behalf of
158 See id. (explaining Singh's statements).
159 See Vioxx Plaintiff Gets $13.5 Million in Damages: Jury Finds that Merck Failed
to Warn N.J. Man of Heart Attack Risks, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Vioxx
PlaintiffGets $13.5 Million in Damages], availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.
com.id.12267697 (estimating number of lawsuits filed in state and federal courts against
Merck).
160 See Texas Sues Merck in Vioxx Recall Case (July 1, 2005), available at
http://www.nynippon.com/vioxx/?p=8 (commenting further that allegations against Merck
include violating Medicaid fraud law in order to gain profits for company).
161 See Vioxx Plaintiff Gets $13.5 Million in Damages, supra note 159 (stating that
ruling in McDarby could lead to investigation by state Attorney's General's Office).
162 See Canadian Shares Cautiously Climb at Open, THOMPSON FIN. CORP. GROUP
(Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.prnewswire.comcgi-bin/stories (summarizing
Justice Department's commencement of criminal investigation regarding how Merck
handled Vioxx).
163 See Letter from Joe Barton, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Energy and Commerce, to Raymond Gilmartin (Nov. 23, 2004), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108News/11232004_1413.htm
(concerning
issues
relating to Vioxx's withdrawal from marketplace).
164 See House Government Reform Committee to Meet on FDA (May 5, 2005), available
at http://gooznews.com/archives/000121.html (looking to give FDA "safety officials more
power to pull drugs from the market and order new clinical trials.").
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participants and beneficiaries of Merck's Savings and Security
Plan and Employee Stock Purchase and Security plan.16 5 The
suit alleges that Merck breached its fiduciary duties under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act by, among other
things, failing to prudently manage the Plan and its assets, and
"failing to provide complete and accurate information to
participants and beneficiaries."166
Whatever profit Merck made from Vioxx will be wiped out by
the litigation. 6 7 As to whether that litigation is warranted, or
the result of greedy attorneys and their clients taking a shot at
the great American lottery-the jury system-it seems clear that
the litigation against Merck is well-founded. 168 The company and
its thousands of employees have hidden information and reports
from prescribing doctors and the public and have fraudulently
and aggressively marketed Vioxx after studies showed, both
before and after FDA approval, that there was a two to five times
increase in cardiovascular risks for those taking Vioxx over other
painkillers or a placebo.16 9 Merck's insistence that they
responded appropriately to evidence of risks and released all
reliable medical data to the FDA and the public, is simply a
smokescreen and rationalization to make executives and
165 See Merck & Co. ERISA Litigation,KELLER ROHRBACK LAW OFFICES, available at
http://www.erisafraud.comlDefault.aspx?tabid=1031
(last visited Nov.
13, 2006)
(explaining complaint was filed in District Court of New Jersey and providing associated
court documents).
166 See id. (noting amended complaint was filed during class period alleging variety of
reasons for Merck's breach of their fiduciary duty).
167 See Mondics, supra note 2, at Al (highlighting that Vioxx generated sales in
excess of $2.5 billion per year since Vioxx was introduced in 1999); see also Vioxx Recall
Lawsuits to Exceed 100,000 (May 24, 2005), available at http://www.mynippon.com/
vioxxI2005/05/vioxx-recall-lawsuits-to-exceed- 1000000.html (noting that Merck's often
cited legal liability is $18 billion, but some estimates say it could reach $55 billion).
168 See, e.g., Henry Waxman, The Marketingof Vioxx to Physicians, Memorandum to
Democratic Members of the Government Reform Committee (May 5, 2005), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.agov/story.asp?ID=848&Issue=Prescription+Drugs
(citing a recent study that "estimated that as many as 88,000 to 140,000 Americans have
suffered Vioxx-related heart attacks, strokes, and other serious medical complications.").
169 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at A1. Merck "directed its 3,000 person Vioxx sales
force to avoid discussions with doctors" about cardiovascular risks, and coached
representatives to be "aggressive salesman." Id. See also Alex Berenson, et al., Despite
Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004),
[hereinafter Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall), available at
http://www.nytimes.com. Merck ignored countless warning signs. Even before Vioxx's
approval, the FDA cited conceivable harm to the heart. Furthermore, in 2000, the VIGOR
study stated that those taking Vioxx were clearly at a greater cardiovascular risk than
those taking naproxen. The FDA even sent a letter to Merck in 2001, telling them "to
correct false or misleading impressions and information," yet the drug was not removed
from the market until September of 2004. Id.

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 22:1

employees feel better when they wake up in the morning.1 70 It is
analogous to the seven tobacco industry executives in the 1980's
standing before a Congressional committee and swearing under
oath that they did not believe tobacco was addictive. During the
Congressional Reform Committee hearings in May 2005, one
Congressman defended Merck's marketing scheme by proffering
that there was no indication the sales tactics were illegal.17 1 The
frosty response from one congressman was, "[i]sn't there a role of
72
ethics to play here?"1
Juries will likely punish Merck severely as jurors place
themselves in the shoes of plaintiffs suffering from a heart attack
or stroke who either died like Robert Ernst or are seriously
debilitated like John McDarby or Gerald Barnett. Those less
severely debilitated by heart attack or stroke after taking Vioxx
for only a short time, on the other hand, may have difficulty
persuading a jury that Vioxx was the "cause" of their
cardiovascular event. 17 3 But the Ernsts and McDarbys and
Barnetts are likely to jump the "causation" hurdle with juries.17 4
In aggressively and with abandon, continuing to market Vioxx
after several studies showed an increased risk from taking Vioxx,
Merck and its employees murdered people.175
D. What Makes Employees so Deadly Loyal?
The evidence is so overwhelming that it is difficult to
understand how Merck's employees can still wholeheartedly
support the company's actions. And yet, ten Merck employees, in
three MBA business ethics classes, at two different universities
170 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 17, at Al (quoting Merck's vice president saying
Merck acted "appropriately and extensively" in its studies of Vioxx, and in disclosing
information)..
171 See Freking, supra note 114, at Nation & World, May 5, 2005 (describing
lawmakers' statements).
172 Id. (quoting Representative Gil Gutknecht of Minnesota).
173 See, e.g., Merck Wins Judgment in Vioxx Case, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Sept. 27,
2006), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/27/business/vioxx.php (reporting
that federal jury ruled in favor of Merck in lawsuit by fifty-six-year-old man who survived
heart attack after taking Vioxx for only four-and-a-half months).
174 See, e.g., $50 Million Award, supra note 58 (citing Barnett v. Merck case, where
jury awarded litigant $50 million dollars after he suffered heart attack and lost ten years
of his life expectancy).
175 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at Al (elaborating on Merck's aggressive marketing);
see also Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, supra note 169
(proposing FDA scientist, David Graham's estimate that Vioxx is associated with more
than 27,000 heart attacks or deaths linked to cardiac problems).
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unabashedly are incensed at the suggestion that Merck did
anything unethical. They point to past examples of Merck
releasing its patent on streptomycin, giving away medications to
combat "river blindness," and providing free prescriptions for the
elderly.
The ten employees accept without reservation
Gilmartin's defense that no "credible" scientific evidence existed
to show Vioxx was dangerous until the September 2004 analysis
of the colon polyps study. But this is simply wishful thinking;
and Merck turned a blind eye to any study that had negative
results. In discussing how employees sublimated safety concerns
and marketed Vioxx, one Merck employee in a moment of candor
reflected: "Perhaps we were guilty of 'group think'."176
Employees simply accepted their boss's explanations without
thinking, much like most MBA students accept the mantra of
"maximizing profits" simply because this is what they have been
taught since their first year undergraduate business courses. In
fact, one study of 2000 graduate students from the top thirteen
business schools found that a business school MBA education not
only fails to improve the moral character of the students, it
actually weakens it as students become indoctrinated with the
belief that the prime responsibility of the corporation is to
maximize profit and shareholder value.177
Merck employees simply accepted the corporate rationalethey were good team players. "Loyalty" is a hallowed wordrevered and rewarded. Employee evaluations and promotions
are based on being "loyal" and a "team player." Do what is best
for the organization. As such, employees often bury their own
internal moral code, as well as their intellect. They go into the
deep freeze, as they often blindly follow those in authority. Or
does that statement seem too bold? But if it is, then how can we
explain the Vioxx debacle? Why did not a single employee blow
the whistle on Merck and its marketing practices?
Perhaps it is because our whole educational system, as well as
the corporatocracy, teaches us to defer to authority. It teaches us
to be followers, to be loyal, and to suspend our intellect. A study
176 The Merck employee was in the author's MBA Business Ethics class at DeSales
University during the winter 2006 term.
177 Dennis A. Gioia, Business Education's Role in the Crisis of Corporate Confidence,
Penn
State
Smeal
College
of
Business,
(Aug.
2002),
available at
http://www.smeal.psu.edu/news/releases/aug02/business.html
(arguing this is
not
influence we as society should want to have).
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of MBA graduates from Harvard several years after entering the
business world reveals the truth about corporations-they want
minions, not critical thinkers with a functioning internal moral
core.
The MBA study revealed informal but powerful
"commandments," which corporations communicated to the
graduates early in their careers: Among those commandmentsperformance is what really counts so make your numbers; be
loyal and show you are a team player; and don't over invest in
ethical behavior. 17 8 The Harvard study shows the premium on
being loyal and being a follower.
But teaching students to be drones begins not during an MBA
program, but in childhood and continues throughout much of the
educational experience. At an early age, we are taught our place
in the hierarchy. We are taught not to question authority, and
we call teachers by last names to show us that in the pecking
order they are above us and are to be respected and followed.
John Gatto, a former "teacher of the year" for the City of New
York as well as "teacher of the year" for the state of New York,
has described how a public school education harms our kids and
society. 17 9 His article traces the history of public schools in the
United States.
He discusses Alexander Inglis's 1918 book,
Principles of Secondary Education, a book that traces the
purpose of education in this country. Inglis, for whom a lecture
in education at Harvard is named, makes it clear "that
compulsory schooling on this continent was intended to be just
what it had been for Prussia in the 1820s, a fifth column into the
burgeoning democratic movement that threatened to give the
peasants and the proletarians a voice at the bargaining table." 18 0
Inglis breaks down the actual purpose of modern schooling into
specific functions. One function served by schools is that they
"are to establish fixed habits of reaction to authority. This, of
course, precludes critical judgment completely."181 A second
purpose of education is to make children as alike as possible,
since people who conform are predictable, and "this is of great
178
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(McGraw-Hill 11th ed. 2005).
179 John Taylor Gatto, Against School, HARPER'S MAG. (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.spinninglobe.net/againstschool.htm. Gatto discusses that the public school
system is not proficient in educating society's youth.
180 See id. at 36 (quoting Inglis).
181 Id.

MERCKAND THE VIOAXDEBACLE

2007]

use to those who wish to harness and manipulate a large labor
force."1 2 He continues. "[s]chools are meant to tag the unfit with
poor
grades,
remedial
placement,
and
other
punishments . ."183
The societal system implied by these rules
will require an elite group of caretakers who will be taught how
to manage and "control a population deliberately dumbed down
and declawed in order that government might proceed
unchallenged and corporations might never want for obedient
labor."184
Thus, Gatto proffers, school trains children to obey reflexively,
without questioning or using critical judgment.1s5 He warns that
our schools are "drill centers for the habits and attitudes that
corporate society demands."18 6 "Mandatory education serves
children only incidentally; its real purpose is to turn them into
servants."18 7 The experience of the corporate world gives
credence to Gatto's and Inglis's views on our educational system.
Surveys, for example, have shown that the "behavior and
example of superiors is listed by managers as the most important
single influence on ethical or unethical behavior in
companies."' 8 8 Stated differently, the study shows that generally
employees are "loyal" and "defer to authority" and in the
workplace sublimate their own internal moral code.
In the case of the Vioxx debacle, Merck's employees were good
team players and good servants, but they lost their moral
compass. Executives and employees buried their morality in
order to sell its blockbuster drug, Vioxx. As many as 55,000
people in the United States may have died as a result, while the
death toll of the millions of people taking Vioxx throughout the
rest of the world is still not known. The Vioxx debacle is an
example of the evil of the "maximizing profits" mantra drummed
into and followed by business students.
After a four-year
undergraduate business program and a three-year MBA
182
183
184
185
public
186
187
188

Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Gatto, supra note 179 (arguing children's use of critical judgment should be one of
school systems' main goals).
Id. at 38.
Id.
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program, most students have been brainwashed to the point that
the mantra seems like manifest destiny. Perhaps it is time for
business schools and corporate America to rethink the mantra.
CONCLUSION
How did the Vioxx debacle happen in a company that has
always appeared to have such high ethical standards? The
answer perhaps lies in the first paragraph of this article.
Between 1999-01 Merck lost its patent protection on five of its
best-selling drugs; two other drugs were to lose their patent
protection by 2007, and Merck had not had a blockbuster drug for
years. Merck was feeling the stress of losing market share and
profits. Merck was under pressure to maximize its profits in a
company whose profits had flattened. And yet the issue was life
and death. During the Ernst trial, one of the Merck witnesses,
Dr. Santanello, grew irritated as Mark Lanier asked her whether
Mr. Ernst had risk factors for heart attacks beyond the use of
Vioxx. 'You're playing this game," she said.18 9 "This is not a
game," he responded. "My client's dead."19o

189 In Training Video, Merck Said Vioxx Did Not Increase Risk of HeartAttack, supra
note 121, at C4.
190 Id.

